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Summary 
Theories of policy neglect of, or discrimination against, 
agriculture in Africa include urban bias (Lipton 1977; 
Bates 1981) and the narrow self-interest of autonomous 
elites (van de Walle 2001). Whilst structural adjustment 
removed much of the previous tax burden on African 
agriculture (Anderson and Masters 2009), the sector 
also saw declining investment from international 
development partners and through national budgets 
(Fan et al. 2009). Whilst there has been some recovery 
in public investment in agriculture over the past 
decade, signalled by the 2003 Maputo Declaration 
(Assembly of the African Union 2003), investment 
in the infrastructural and institutional public goods 
needed to support smallholder-led agricultural growth 
remains disappointing. As a result, the contribution of 
the agricultural sector to growth and poverty reduction 
objectives in Africa is widely believed to have been below 
potential.
In theory, democratisation, which has proceeded 
unevenly across Africa during the past two decades, 
should encourage pro-poor agricultural policy, as the 
majority of voters in many countries remain rural and poor. 
This paper draws on case studies of recent policy change 
(attempted and actual) in eight African countries, plus 
an analysis of the political systems in these countries, to 
explore the evolving role of competitive electoral politics 
in agricultural policy making. An important observation 
is that politicians are as likely to rely on ethnic allegiances 
and forms of social or political control to secure votes 
as they are to engage in policy competition. Moreover, 
the political incentives facing senior policy makers in 
the agricultural and rural development sphere may be 
inimical to the development of strong institutions to 
promote smallholder agricultural growth. Instead the 
paper finds that it is exogenous factors - macroeconomic 
dependence on agriculture and, most strikingly, sustained 
threats to regime survival - that create positive incentives 
for agricultural investment, even where social or political 
control is relied on to secure votes. The implications for 
participants in agricultural policy processes are briefly 
explored.
1. Updating Bates (1981)
The seminal work on the political economy of 
agricultural policy in Africa was produced by Bates 
(1981). He sought to explain major common features 
of agricultural policy then prevailing in Africa – most 
notably, the high level of taxation imposed upon the 
sector, combined with targeted support to selected (elite) 
producers – as well as variations in observed policy across 
countries. 
Writing prior to both structural adjustment and 
democratisation in Africa, Bates argued that African 
political elites had been successful in suppressing any 
genuinely pro-farmer political movements, as had 
appeared in the Ghana cocoa belt in the 1950s and as a 
result of competition within KANU in Kenya in the 1960s. 
By contrast, they were concerned to keep major urban 
groups (civil servants and industrial workers) happy, 
both because any unrest would be “on their doorstep” 
and because, as part of the post-independence drive for 
national ownership and import-substituting industrial 
development, African states had become major 
employers. Thus, most agricultural activities were heavily 
taxed, either indirectly (through distorted exchange rate 
regimes that penalised producers of tradable goods) or 
directly (most notably through administrative pricing or 
taxes on export crops). Meanwhile, some governments 
also distributed subsidised inputs to compensate some 
agricultural producers. These were generally distributed 
in such a way as to garner political support amongst well-
connected groups in rural areas, along with “wealthy and 
politically influential members of the urban elite” (p56) 
who also had access to farmland. Politically, subsidised 
inputs (plus similarly rationed access to credit) divided 
progressive farmers from the majority of rural producers. 
Many of the former chose to become part of the ruling 
party, so as to gain access to inputs and credit, whilst the 
latter were left leaderless. Instead of agitating for better 
agricultural policies and prices, rural leaders competed to 
bring projects to their areas, as sources of local patronage.
As well as seeking to present the political roots of 
common anti-agricultural policies, Bates was interested in 
differences across countries. Factors that he highlighted 
as contributing to diverse policy outcomes included:
•	  The extent to which the governing coalition 
at the time of independence was urban (the 
majority of countries) or rural (e.g. Kenya, 
Cote d’Ivoire). There was also some overlap 
here with ongoing elite engagement in 
agricultural production: “Where the elite 
engages in the production of a food item [as 
in rice in northern Ghana or maize in Kenya], 
policies are not employed to depress its price” 
(p43); 
•	  The extent to which farmer organisations 
had independent origins (as in much of East 
Africa) or were creations of government (as in 
West Africa). Farmers in the latter situations 
were observed to receive a lower share of the 
relevant world market price;
 
•	  The availability of non-agricultural resources, 
especially minerals, as a source of tax revenue 
and foreign exchange. Mineral economies 
were observed to promote more heavily 
subsidised inputs and to apply less downward 
pressure on export crop prices;
•	  Socialist vs capitalist states. In the former, 
higher numbers of state companies and 
employees created greater incentives for 
states (as employers) to maintain low food 
prices;
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•	  Ironically, the stronger a country’s or region’s 
comparative advantage in producing a 
crop, the more that crop was often taxed, as 
producers did not tend to exit production.
Bates’ basic analysis remains persuasive: the majority 
of rural producers are poor, with limited education and 
politically disorganised, and so exert very limited power 
over African policy makers. However, at least three major 
and highly pertinent changes have taken place in African 
economies and polities since the original work: the 
implementation of structural adjustment programmes, 
the greater role played by donors in the policy making 
process and the (re-) introduction of competitive electoral 
politics. These necessitate an updating of the analysis. 
From Taxation to Lack of 
Investment
A major achievement of structural adjustment policies 
was the reduction in policy distortions that negatively 
affected the agricultural sector (Anderson and Masters 
2009). This means that such distortions are no longer 
the dominant agricultural policy concern that they 
once were1 . On the other hand, lack of investment in 
the infrastructural and institutional public goods needed 
to support smallholder-led agricultural growth remains 
an issue. 
Infrastructure – especially roads, irrigation and 
communications technology – is vital for smallholder-led 
agricultural growth because smallholders are 
geographically dispersed and, in Africa, heavily 
dependent at present on often low and/or unpredictable 
rainfall. Commission for Africa 2005 emphasised the 
importance of infrastructure investment in general. You 
et al. (2011) argue that major investments in irrigation, 
both large- and small-scale, are both feasible from a water 
management perspective and economically promising. 
Dorward et al. (2004) observe that major investments 
in rural infrastructure helped create the conditions for 
adoption of  Green Revolution technologies in Asia. 
Meanwhile, Poulton et al. (2006) and Poulton et al. 
(2010) discuss the range of support services required 
by smallholder producers if they are to intensify 
their production activities. As individual smallholder 
households transact in small volumes of inputs and 
outputs, unlike commercial farms they cannot justify 
going far to access these services. The challenge of 
providing a range of services close to the farm gate 
can only be met if strong coordination mechanisms 
are in place. Depending on the commodity in question, 
coordination may be achieved through private sector 
leadership of supply chains, strong farmer organisations 
or strategic state intervention. In all case, however, 
there is likely to be an important role – regulation, 
facilitation or leadership - for capable and motivated 
state organisations.
Funding is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for the investment being discussed here. As observed 
by Fan et al. (2009) (p3-4), government spending on 
agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa hardly increased at all in 
“2000 international dollars” terms, and fell as a proportion 
of both agricultural GDP and national budgets, during 
the 1980s and 1990s, i.e. much of the period since Bates 
(1981). (It then rebounded somewhat in the first half of 
the past decade, a trend that we shall return to later). 
Meanwhile, official development assistance to African 
agriculture collapsed during the 1990s (World Bank 
2007, p41).
However, lack of investment in infrastructural and 
institutional public goods goes deeper than just a lack 
of funding and, conversely, rising funding does not 
necessarily mean that all is well: the nature and quality 
of investment going into agriculture is also extremely 
important. As Malawi demonstrates, the 10% budget 
share target that African heads of state set for themselves 
in Maputo in 2003 can quite readily be achieved through 
expensive subsidy programmes without engaging 
in the public goods investments that are critical for 
longer-term transformation of the sector2 . One of the 
major hypotheses underlying the Future Agricultures 
Consortium Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in 
Africa (PEAPA) studies is that the degree of “political will” 
to support smallholder-led agricultural growth, through 
effective policy backed by adequate levels of investment, 
is explained  in large part by the incentives faced by policy 
makers through the domestic political system. These in 
turn vary considerably from country to country.
Donors, the Neo-Patrimonial 
State and the Politics of 
Structural Adjustment
The second major change since Bates (1981) is the 
increased role of donors in agricultural policy making 
in Africa. Bates (1981) paid little attention to the role of 
donors in policy formulation, but donors undoubtedly 
assumed a more prominent role during and after 
structural adjustment. Indeed, both the reduction in 
agricultural taxation and moves towards democratisation 
in many African countries may be traced in part to their 
influence. These examples notwithstanding, the paper 
still assumes the “primacy of domestic politics” (de 
Renzio 2006) over agricultural policy making. Donors 
Figure 1: Linking the Political System and 
Agricultural Performance
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are undoubtedly important players interacting with 
these domestic political forces, but their influence can 
be overstated. As argued by van de Walle (2001) and 
Cooksey (2012), local elites have ways of using donor 
support to buttress their own interests.
van de Walle (2001) popularised the notion of 
African states as “neo-patrimonial”. Whilst this notion 
is undoubtedly open to criticism, its central insight is 
valuable - that within the African state a rational-legal 
element and a (patronage) political element exist in 
tension. The rational-legal element encompasses the 
formal structures and processes of a Weberian-style 
bureaucracy: systems for decision-making, budgeting 
and accounting, clear responsibilities associated with 
particular offices etc. Its policy “logic” begins with the 
articulation of public policy objectives, on the assumption 
that there is some definable public interest. In the early 
years of the twenty-first century these public policy 
objectives are commonly aligned with the Millennium 
Development Goals and are articulated in the latest 
PRSP. Rational-legal logic dictates that laws, policies and 
budgets are then developed, passed and implemented 
(principally via the bureaucracy) to achieve these stated 
objectives, with learning from experience leading to 
changes in an iterative fashion until the objectives are 
achieved. This rational-legal logic is promoted by local 
technocrats within African states and is also what donors 
subscribe to and the stated basis on which they invest3.. 
By contrast, the political element operates according to 
a different logic: here, the starting question asked by 
senior politicians is, “what is required to stay in power?”. 
This may lead to very different “policy in practice” from 
that contained in public policy documents4. 
The presence of two different “logics” within the 
African state, generating different policy sets, creates 
a range of policy scenarios that are summarized in the 
simple 2*2 matrix in Table 1:
The assumption behind Table 1 is that, to even make 
it to the discussion table, a policy proposal needs the 
support of either a senior politician(s) or technocrats. 
In other words, it must make sense in either political 
or public policy terms. The top left-hand cell of Table 1, 
where neither of these conditions holds, is thus blank. 
However, the “primacy of domestic politics” is reflected 
in the fact that, once at the discussion table, political 
interests are ultimately assumed to dominate.
Many policy initiatives are proposed by technocrats 
in pursuit of stated public policy goals. However, if they 
do not have a clear political logic, they may simply never 
gain the political “championing” necessary to bring them 
to the cabinet table, present the necessary legislation to 
parliament or ensure the sustained implementation of a 
formally agreed policy. Table 1 describes this as “inertia”, 
although there could be elements of outright opposition 
as well (all the more reason why a political champion 
is needed!). Inertia can be played out in a number of 
ways. Legislation may never be finalised or presented 
to Parliament. A ministry, desirous of donor resources 
flowing through its doors, may authorize new initiatives 
on a pilot basis, but then never seriously review them or 
seek to scale them up. New policies might be declared 
on paper, but never implemented. As a result of the weak 
performance incentives facing ministries (explained 
below), we observe that “inertia” is a very common 
scenario in African policy making – to the considerable 
frustration of donors!
Cell 2 is the opposite of “inertia”: here there is a political 
logic for something that technocrats can confidently 
predict will not contribute to the achievement of stated 
public policy objectives. However, as political imperatives 
prevail, technocrats are unable to head off or adequately 
amend the proposed initiative, and the result in cell 2 is 
an anti-poor outcome.
Cell 3 is where donors and technocrats, in particular, 
want to be – agricultural success stories! Efforts to 
document such success stories (e.g. Haggblade 2004; 
Spielman and Pandya-Lorch 2009) typically tell the 
technical side of the story. However, it is suggested here 
that, alongside the technical story, there often has to be 
a political story: why was it in the interest of key political 
figures to champion the intervention in question and 
create the conditions (legal, policy, budgetary) for its 
scaling up?
Cell 3 is deliberately kept small and it shares its space 
with scenario 4. This in intended to capture policy 
initiatives that are initially promoted by technocrats 
and gain political backing as they do so. However, as 
policy development and implementation proceeds, 
it becomes clear that the interests of technocrats and 
politicians are at best only partially aligned. Decisions 
are thus taken that ultimately combine to undermine the 
pro-poor impact that technocrats had envisaged from 
the intervention.
Table 1: Policy Scenarios in a Neo-Patrimonial State
Technocratic Support?
No Yes
Political Backing? No - 1. Inertia
Yes 2. Anti-poor policy 3. Success Stories
4. Distorted Policy
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In practice, of course, the dividing lines between 
scenarios 2 and 4 and scenarios 3 and 4 can become 
blurred. However, policy reform experiences, such as 
those examined by the PEAPA case studies, can still 
usefully be interrogated in these terms.
Meanwhile, returning to structural adjustment, the 
assumption of “primacy of domestic politics” does beg 
the question as to why African political elites were willing 
to concede such dramatic reductions in agricultural 
taxation, given the arguments advanced by Bates (1981) 
regarding the domestic political determinants of such 
taxation. We conclude this section by noting a number 
of arguments that have been advanced to explain this. 
There may be some truth in all of them, although there 
are not fully mutually compatible.
Firstly, van de Walle (2001) argued that Bates 
overstated the power of (urban) interest groups within 
African societies. One of van de Walle’s main arguments 
in support of this position was the limited resistance to 
the reduction in the real value of public sector wages 
across a range of African countries during the 1990s. van 
de Walle (2001) thus emphasised the autonomy of African 
governments from civil society pressures and argued that 
a very small national elite (typically, only a few thousand 
people per country) has been able to pursue its own 
narrow interest, an interest that it could defend even 
through a protracted economic crisis.
Secondly, whilst recognising that domestic political 
considerations do generally determine policy outcomes, 
Binswanger and Deininger (1997) argue that external 
actors (e.g. international financial institutions and 
bilateral donors) may exert greater pressure during times 
of acute fiscal crisis, such as the crises that precipitated 
structural adjustment reforms. Thirdly, however, Lofchie 
(1994) argues – with particular reference to Tanzania - 
that policies of agricultural taxation ultimately hurt even 
the urban groups that they were supposed to benefit, as 
reduced production put upward pressure on prices and/
or led to scarcity in a context of price controls and foreign 
exchange shortages. Thus, even urban interest groups 
were willing to countenance agricultural liberalisation.
Finally, it is likely that popular resistance to the 
reduction of anti-agricultural taxation was reduced by 
the fact that world prices for major cereals and many 
other agricultural commodities were falling or low 
through much of the structural adjustment era. From an 
economics perspective, this was perhaps a bad thing, as it 
meant that the supply response to structural adjustment 
reforms was more muted than hoped for. However, from 
a political perspective, it was fortuitous, as it assisted 
the adoption of key pro-agricultural reforms with few 
popular (especially urban) protests.
Democratisation
Meanwhile, the main focus of this paper is 
democratisation and the impacts that this is having, and 
could have, on “political will” to support smallholder-led 
agricultural growth in Africa. In practice most of the 
discussion is centred on the introduction of competitive 
elections for national political office, which is only one 
element of democratisation, albeit an important one. 
Thus, it is important to recognise at the outset that 
democratisation encompasses a range of measures 
designed to make leaders more accountable and 
responsive to citizens. These include freedom of the 
press, of speech and of political organisation, which 
in turn may need to be defended by an independent 
judiciary5 . Democratisation is thus a process, rather than a 
one-off change. Anticipating some of the later arguments 
and findings of this paper, one of the reasons why 
democratisation has not so far led to greatly enhanced 
policy support for smallholder-led agricultural growth 
in Africa may be that this process is still in many ways 
in its infancy.
The reason for thinking that democratisation could 
contribute to reversing decades of policy neglect of 
agriculture is as follows: as politicians are forced to 
compete for votes in regular elections, the pressure 
increases for them to give voters what they want and/
or need in exchange for their votes. In most African 
countries, the majority of the population is still rural 
and poor, outweighing the combined numbers of 
urban dwellers and rural elites who benefited from 
the policies described by Bates (1981). This poor, rural 
majority would be well served by policy and investment 
to support smallholder-led growth, either because they 
themselves directly engage in agricultural production 
and/or because they supply labour to other smallholder 
households or engage in non-farm activities, the demand 
for which comes in large part from agricultural incomes, 
or spend large proportions of their income on food 
purchase, so benefit from lowered food prices.
As noted by Bates and Block 2009 (p6), there was a 
“striking shift towards political competition” in Africa 
in the 1990s and early 2000s. Bates and Block (2009) 
use the World Bank’s Agricultural Distortions database 
to show that, whereas under autocratic rule a higher 
share of population living in rural areas is associated 
with greater taxation of agriculture, under competitive 
electoral politics6  the degree of taxation reduces as the 
share of population living in rural areas increases. This 
suggests that democratisation may already have begun 
to strengthen political incentives for policy support to 
smallholder agriculture in Africa, even if the dependent 
variable is taxation rather than the investment in public 
goods highlighted above. Note, however, that this basic 
result could be observed either because competitive 
electoral politics encourages governments to pay more 
attention to the interests of the majority rural population 
or because a common third factor was more influential in 
some countries than others in pushing both for reform 
of agricultural pricing policies and for electoral reform. 
Possible candidates for this common third factor include 
donor pressure and domestic dissatisfaction arising from 
the economic stagnation that proceeded from excessive 
taxation of agriculture.
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Critically, the argument that democratisation may 
strengthen political incentives for policy support to 
smallholder agriculture in Africa assumes that politicians 
primarily exchange policies for votes. Drawing on existing 
literature and the PEAPA country case studies, the paper 
argues that this assumption does not hold in most of 
Africa. It reviews arguments as to why programmatic 
political parties have generally not yet emerged and looks 
at how votes are, instead, gathered in rural Africa. The 
case studies suggest that policy is rarely the dominant 
approach to gathering votes.
Nevertheless, political competition is increasing 
voters’ expectations of getting something in exchange 
for their vote. Given the continued prevalence of 
clientelistic relationships within African political systems, 
the argument advanced is that increasing political 
competition often leads to increasing clientelistic 
transfers, something that agriculture is well suited to. 
This is consistent with the increased budgets going to 
agriculture in 2000-05, observed by Fan et al. (2009), 
and the commitment by African leaders at Maputo in 
2003 to raise the share of national budgets allocated to 
agriculture to 10% within five years. However, it suggests 
that progress towards the implementation of the “sound 
policies for agricultural and rural development” that were 
supposed to provide the framework for the increased 
expenditure (Assembly of the African Union 2003, p1) 
may be rather slower. Instead, increases in expenditure 
may well be achieved through increased transfers (e.g. 
subsidies of one form or another), rather than investment 
in the infrastructural and institutional public goods that 
are needed to support smallholder-led growth. This 
argument is consistent with the observations of Joughin 
and Kjaer (2010) for the case of Uganda and of Kjaer and 
Therkildsen (2011) reviewing this and three other recent 
case studies undertaken for the Elites, Production and 
Poverty programme.
Whilst weak demand for good policy emanating from 
democratising political systems is bad news, it should be 
noted that Asian agricultural growth during the Green 
Revolution period was rarely driven by electoral demand. 
Instead, the incentives leading political elites to support 
broad-based agricultural intensification included:
•	  existential threats to regime survival, 
sometimes from a combination of external 
(e.g. spread of Communism in neighbouring 
countries) and internal (Communist 
sympathy) sources (Campos and Root 1996);
•	  rural disquiet if agriculture was neglected too 
badly, especially where this tipped over into 
famine (see, for example, Gulati et al. 2005 
on the political drivers of the introduction of 
household responsibility reforms in China); 
 
•	 national rivalry.
 
Moore (1998) explains why rivalry has been a much 
less potent force for development in post-independence 
Africa than in, say, Asia. However, the PEAPA case studies 
do include examples of existential threats and potential 
rural disquiet (Rwanda, Ethiopia) driving policy makers 
to invest in agriculture. Hence, as with Bates (1981), 
the paper concludes by arguing that variations around 
its observed central tendency are well explained by a 
political economy framework.
2. Country Case Studies
This paper draws on case studies of recent policy 
change (attempted and actual) in eight African 
countries, plus an analysis of the political systems in 
these countries. The countries in question are Burkina 
Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Rwanda and Tanzania. These countries were chosen 
for study in some cases due to historic connections to 
Future Agricultures Consortium, but more generally 
because they represented a diverse range of political 
systems (with varying degrees of political liberalization 
and competition, dominance of ruling party, inter-ethnic 
competition), histories and traditions (Anglophone, 
Francophone and Lusophone, degree of past socialist 
influence), geography (population density, agro-
ecological diversity) and economic diversification.
Selecting indicators to compare agricultural 
performance is fraught with difficulties. However, Figures 
2 and 3 provide two such measures, drawn from World 
Development Indicators data for 2010. Figure 2 shows 
that several of the case study countries have performed 
relatively well (above population growth rates) in terms 
of growth of agricultural value added in recent years. 
From this figure Burkina, Mozambique and Rwanda 
would appear to be the most consistent performers, 
with Ethiopia doing particularly well in the past decade. 
However, there are some important caveats:
•	  In both Mozambique and Rwanda, the 
1994-2001 figures incorporate recovery 
from conflict. Meanwhile, in Mozambique’s 
case, the 2002-09 figures largely reflect good 
performance in export crops, with sugar in 
particular dominated by large-scale farms 
(see Figure 3). By contrast, as explained by 
Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012), serious 
attention was only paid to agricultural 
development in Rwanda following two years 
of poor harvests in 2003 and 2004. If only 
the years 2005-09 are considered, then the 
growth of agricultural value added in Rwanda 
rises to 6.2% p.a.
•	  In the case of Kenya, the average figure for 
2002-09 is dragged down by the conflict in 
2008, whilst the Malawi figure is dragged 
down the drought of 2005. If only 2006-09 
is considered (i.e. since the introduction of the 
input subsidy and excluding the drought), 
then growth of agricultural value added in 
Malawi rises to 7.9% p.a.
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Figure 3: Cereals Production Growth 1999/2001-2006/08, % p.a.
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Figure 2: Annual Change in Agricultural Value Added, 1994-2009
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Figure 3 usefully complements Figure 2. Burkina, 
Ethiopia and Rwanda are (again) shown to have been 
strong performers in food production terms in recent 
years, as is Tanzania, where the southern highlands 
maize production story deserves more investigation. The 
growth in maize production in Malawi under the fertilizer 
subsidy programme is again understated by the choice 
of years. What the figures do show is how much of the 
growth of agricultural value added in Mozambique has 
been due to export crops. This may also be true for Ghana 
(cocoa), although root crops are also important in Ghana.
Table 2 presents available evidence on rural poverty 
in the case study countries. Many of the figures are quite 
dated, but the table nevertheless represents a useful 
counterpart to the figures on agricultural growth. The 
table suggests processes of rural poverty reduction in 
Rwanda, Malawi (perhaps of a surprising magnitude 
given the dates?), Ghana, Ethiopia and (much more 
modestly) Kenya, but stagnation in Burkina, Tanzania 
and Mozambique.
The Rwanda figures represent a striking change from 
the first half of the 2000s, when poverty (national and 
rural) hardly fell. In Ghana the story has been one of 
sustained poverty reduction since the 1990s, but with 
the benefits heavily concentrated in the south and centre 
of the country.Poverty rates in the three northernmost 
regions, where livelihoods are the most dependent on 
food crop production, have fallen very little (Ghana 
Statistical Service 2007).
Lack of progress with rural poverty reduction in 
Mozambique and Tanzania is striking, given the high 
levels of macroeconomic growth enjoyed by both 
countries, and would appear to reflect relative neglect 
of the rural sector by policy makers in both countries. 
This is all the more striking given the widely recognized 
agricultural potential of both countries, but perhaps 
especially Mozambique (World Bank 2009). It should 
also be remembered, however, that African data are 
often of poor quality: Pauw and Thurlow (2011) conclude 
that official agricultural growth and poverty reduction 
statistics in Tanzania are incompatible - either agricultural 
production growth has been less than claimed or there 
has been more rural poverty reduction than is indicated 
by the figures below.
Figure 4 shows data on the share of national budget 
devoted to agricultural and rural development, as per the 
Maputo Declaration target, even if this is an imperfect 
indicator of public goods investment in support of 
smallholder agricultural growth as discussed above. 
The high budget shares in Burkina and Ethiopia are 
(again) noteworthy, but these may be contrasted with 
the very low share in Rwanda. As explained by Booth and 
Golooba-Mutebi (2012), the share of the budget devoted 
to agriculture in Rwanda has been growing rapidly since 
2007. The Malawi figure of 12.2% in 2007 is explained 
in large part by the cost of the input subsidy scheme, 
which increased even further in 2008-9, but has since 
declined again.
Demographically, in 2009 more than 70% of the 
population lived in rural areas in all case study countries 
except Ghana (49%) and Mozambique (62%). In both of 
these countries the share of the rural population had 
fallen by more than 10% since 1990 (see Appendix). 
Population density varies dramatically from Mozambique 
(29 persons per km2 in 2008) and Tanzania (48 persons 
per km2) to Malawi (158 persons per km2) and Rwanda 
(394 persons per km2). In the remaining four countries, 
a noteworthy feature is the variation in population 
density across regions (for example, between highlands 
and semi-arid lands in Kenya and Ethiopia). Rwanda is 
also an outlier in the sample in terms of (low) ethnic 
diversity, as captured by the so-called ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization index, which “measures the probability 
that two randomly drawn individuals from the overall 
population belong to different ethnic groups” (Bossert et 
al. 2005, p1). At the other end of the spectrum, Tanzania 
Table 2: Share of Rural Population Living Below (National) Rural Poverty Line
Country Year Rural 
Poverty 
Headcount 
(%)
Year Rural Poverty Headcount 
(%)
Burkina Faso 2003 52.3% 2009 50.7%
Ethiopia 1999 45.4% 2004 39.3%
Ghana 1998 49.6% 2006 39.2%
Kenya 1997 52.9% 2005 49.1%
Malawi 1998 66.5% 2004 55.9%
Mozambique 2002 55.3% 2008 56.9%
Rwanda 2005/06 61.9% 2010/11 48.7%
Tanzania 2000 38.6% 2007 37.4%
Source: World Bank African Development Indicators (2011) except Burkina Faso = Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances 
2011, Rwanda = National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda 2012
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and Kenya appear the most ethnically diverse nations 
in the sample.
Finally, there is relatively little variation across the 
countries in scores for public sector management and 
institutional quality, as judged by the World Bank’s 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
ratings. In 2011 the average CPIA score for public sector 
management and institutional quality ranged from 3.7 
for Burkina and Ghana to 3.3 for Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi 
and Tanzania. The average scores across 78 countries 
eligible to receive International Development Association 
loans ranged from 4.0 to 2.2, such that all eight case 
study countries were in the top half of the list (albeit still 
with only modest scores!). The question that this paper, 
therefore, seeks to answer is why some governments and 
states are more committed to supporting smallholder 
agricultural growth than others, despite similar state 
capacity and governance quality.
3. Choosing a President
A key assumption of political economy analysis is 
that “mandate” is important to observed policy. In the 
general model presented by Drazen (2008), the core 
group of people whose support a leader relies upon 
in order to obtain or maintain power are called the 
selectorate. In exchange for their support, the leader 
offers the selectorate a range of (primarily but not 
exclusively economic) benefits, delivered through state 
interventions that can range from formal policy to ad 
hoc (and perhaps illegal) transfers and reallocations of 
property rights (Khan 2005). Historically, the selectorate 
in much of Africa has been quite narrow. Bates (1981) 
emphasised the importance of urban interests and the 
rural elite, but (as noted above) van de Walle (2001) of 
these groups. Democratisation attempts to widen the 
selectorate, such that the collective voice of individual 
citizens counts for more. For reasons to be discussed 
(including social relations and deference, lack of 
education and awareness, poverty leading to economic 
dependence), that voice is not yet as strong as it could be. 
Nevertheless, most African leaders and their governing 
coalitions now have to submit themselves to an electoral 
contest every 4-5 years. Whilst some manipulation of 
the electoral process remains possible (and is indeed 
common), they still have to offer something to voters 
in return for their support.
According to van de Walle (2001), a striking feature 
of many African political systems is the extent to which 
political power is centralized around the person of 
the president. Active presidential support for a policy 
initiative is the ultimate manifestation of “political will” for 
it. This section thus considers how presidents are chosen 
within African political systems.
One distinction to be made is between countries where 
the outcome of the presidential election itself is rarely 
in doubt, such that the primary selection process within 
the ruling party is the “real” contest, and those where 
the public election itself is the real contest. Within the 
PEAPA countries, Burkina, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania7 
and perhaps also Mozambique may be considered 
as falling into the former category. In these cases, a 
difficulty for analysts may lie in observing the basis on 
which choice of presidential candidate is made, as the 
debates occur “behind closed doors” within the party. 
However, some debates become public. One can also 
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ask who the power brokers within the ruling party are 
and where their interests lie. Thus Cooksey (2012) notes 
struggles within the CCM leadership, with “a minority 
faction concerned that growing political corruption 
will weaken the economy and strengthen the hand of 
opposition parties” (p24).
Moreover, in an era of democratisation, even a 
dominant ruling party still has to formally reassert its 
dominance through regular “multi-party” elections. 
Whilst some such governments rely on legal restrictions 
on competition and repression of the opposition, even 
apparently dominant parties also rely on mechanisms 
for securing support that are similar to those observed in 
countries with more competitive presidential elections.
Leaving aside legal restrictions on competition 
and repression of the opposition, the mechanisms 
for securing support in a presidential election can be 
summarized as follows:
The columns of Figure 5 suggest that elections can 
be fought in at least three ways:
•	  On the basis of national issues
•	  By forming alliances of regional voting blocs, 
in which case different “offers” can be made 
to each bloc
•	  By making a multiplicity of local promises – 
often on the campaign trail – or otherwise 
securing votes through local control 
measures.
In turn, as indicated within the columns, a number of 
mechanisms can be used to deliver on either regional or 
local-based strategies. In practice, campaigns are likely to 
be fought using a combination of the three approaches 
shown in Figure 5. The following sections consider each 
in turn.
(Constraints to the Emergence 
of) Policy-Based Competition
To look presidential, a candidate should have at least 
one major policy proposition that appeals to a broad 
spectrum of the population. However, various arguments 
are advanced as to why, in many African countries, 
recourse to ethnic identity (hence often regional alliances, 
given ethnic fractionalisation) is seen as a more “efficient” 
way of mobilizing votes than policy-based appeals.
Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) and other works from the 
same “stable” (e.g. World Bank 2007, chapter 4) emphasise 
credibility problems in new democracies, such as most of 
the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Semi-literate voters 
with limited access to information about policy issues are 
poorly placed to assess the credibility of promises made 
by campaigning politicians. Thus many politicians make 
extravagant promises that they cannot or will not fulfill. 
In this context, it is hard (costly) for a “serious” candidate 
to persuade voters that their promises – whilst perhaps 
superficially less attractive than the alternatives – are, 
in fact, credible (i.e. both reasonable and likely to be 
fulfilled). This constrains the emergence of the types of 
programmatic political parties assumed under simple 
models of democracy.
However, Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) argue that making 
appeals through local intermediaries can increase the 
credibility of promises. There are two elements to this. On 
the one hand, intermediaries (local patrons) are known 
by the local electorate, so a promise conveyed through 
them is more likely to be believed. On the other hand, 
to maintain their own credibility locally, local patrons 
are only likely to act as political intermediaries if they 
gain some assurance from the national political figure 
that promises will actually be fulfilled. Reliance on local 
intermediaries, however, distorts policy making away 
from provision of national-level public goods towards 
provision of benefits targeted to particular regions of 
localities.
According to Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), one of the 
main challenges in developing an effective programmatic 
party is to get party representatives to speak credibly with 
one voice when the policy preference rankings of party 
members and officials are all slightly different. This is 
partly a challenge of asserting party discipline, but it also 
requires that the party develop an ideology that is strong 
enough to guide internal discussions across a range of 
issues in a coherent way. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007)
thus talk of the “ideology work” (p9) needed to establish 
programmatic political parties.
A third variation on the theme of establishing credibility 
focuses on the low capacity of the African states that 
parties know they will inherit if they assume power. This 
makes it unwise to promise much, especially on a national 
scale, if you expect voters to hold you accountable for 
what you promise, as the state may well not have the 
capability of delivering on anything but the most modest 
(or localized) of promises.
Figure 5: Securing Support in a Presidential 
Election
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Arguments about the credibility of promises focus on 
problems on the “supply side” of programmatic politics. 
By contrast, Khan (2005) argues that the real constraint 
to the formation of programmatic political parties in 
low income economies lies on the “demand side” and is 
rooted in the basic economic structure of these countries. 
He argues that, in “mature” democracies such as those 
found in many OECD countries:
•	 Processes of industrialization have generated 
large groups with common economic (“class”) 
interests, e.g. entrepreneurs, salaried workers
•	 The public budget is large relative to GDP, 
so political struggles meaningfully focus on 
how the budget is raised and utilized, issues 
that have major distributional implications.
By contrast, in low income economies that are 
dominated (in workforce terms) by smallholder 
agriculture and informal sector business/trading activity:
•	 Smallholder producers are poor and 
dispersed, often contending with very 
different agro-ecological conditions, and 
have little awareness of their common 
economic interests
•	 Informal sector workers are also not organized 
and moreover compete fiercely with one 
another for small margins – not a conducive 
environment for collective political action
•	 The tax base is narrow and the public budget 
modest relative to GDP. Hence, political 
struggles are as likely to focus on the (re-)
distribution of property rights8  as on the 
distribution of the budget.
These conditions make it difficult for politicians to 
mobilize large numbers of voters through appeals made 
primarily on the basis of (national) policy. To illustrate 
this point, it is useful to consider potential policies that 
could have widespread national appeal for a presidential 
election campaign in a (stylized) Sub-Saharan African 
context. Given limited industrialization, the list is quite 
short: (free) universal primary education, followed in due 
course by universal secondary education, free primary 
health care … (Note the prominence of these issues 
in presidential election campaigns in many African 
countries since the mid-1990s). Below we return to the 
point that, in most African countries, few agricultural 
policies would have the desired national appeal.
Within the PEAPA study, the one country that has more 
than one established political party with a recognized 
ideological basis is Ghana9 . However, even here, there 
is an ongoing debate as to whether or not political 
competition can be described as programmatic (Lindberg 
and Morrison 2005; World Bank 2007). The PEAPA Ghana 
country study (forthcoming) notes the importance of the 
1992 constitution both in embedding the position of the 
two established parties and in forcing them (through 
a requirement that a winning presidential candidate 
secure at least 50%+1 of all votes cast) to appeal beyond 
their core support bases to win power. Combined with 
the historical roots of the parties in ideological debates 
and their degree of party discipline, this can be seen as 
“supplying” many of the requirements for programmatic 
politics. Arguably, however, as per Khan (2005), the 
“demand side” is still weak, with the result both that 
separate appeals can be made to distinct (often regional) 
voting groups and that there remains considerable 
reliance on clientelistic purchase of votes at local level.
Afrobarometer data is now being used to explore the 
determinants of voting behaviour across Africa. Bratton 
et al. (2011) use data from Afrobarometer survey round 3 
(2005) from 16 countries, including five of the PEAPA case 
study countries (Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Tanzania), to explore voting intentions in a forthcoming 
presidential election. They find that “An individual who 
belongs to the same ethnic group as the incumbent 
president … is far more likely to express an intention to 
vote for the ruling party” (p9-10), whereas groups who 
perceive ethnic discrimination are likely to vote against. 
However, ethnicity is not the only determinant of voting 
intentions. Voters who perceive that a government has 
managed the economy well and who evaluate future 
economic conditions in the country positively are also 
more likely to vote for the ruling party. Bratton et al. 
(2011) also find evidence of partisanship in the form of 
people who express closeness to the ruling party and an 
intention to vote for it, despite assessing the president’s 
past performance poorly. Given the advantages of 
incumbency within African elections, they suggest that 
some of these people are likely motivated by the desire 
to back the winner, so as not to exclude themselves from 
future patronage flows.
Meanwhile, Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) undertake a 
similar analysis for Kenya, based on a survey just prior 
to the hotly contested 2007 election. A striking finding 
here is that, in a logistic regression analysis, dummies for 
the eight largest ethnic groups alone can explain “more 
than half of the variance (r square =.514) in the intended 
presidential vote” (p8). However, voter assessment of the 
first term of President Kibaki was also found to affect 
voting intentions, with those expressing overall approval 
of presidential performance or approval specifically 
of policies affecting living standards, school fees and 
corruption more likely to say that they would vote for 
re-election.
Whilst the arguments of Khan (2005) suggest that the 
emergence of truly programmatic political parties could 
take decades in parts of Africa, these Afrobarometer 
results do at least indicate that most governments have 
to be seen to perform in some way if they are to retain 
power. Unfortunately, Afrobarometer surveys do not yet 
contain questions specifically about agricultural policies. 
Meanwhile, Bratton et al. (2011) found that, when other 
effects were controlled for, the likelihood of a rural voter 
voting for a ruling party was 6 percentage points higher 
than that of an urban voter. This suggests that rural voters 
tend to be relatively undemanding of those in power.
Working Paper 043 www.future-agricultures.org12
Mobilising Support on a 
Regional Basis
As already seen, ethnic allegiances and authority 
structures are widely seen as an efficient way of mobilizing 
voting support across Africa. Thus, it is common for 
senior representatives of a particular ethnic group to 
be included within a campaigning (and, ultimately, 
governing) coalition in order that they in turn “bring in” 
the votes of people from their group or region.
However, the dotted line in the “regional” column of 
Figure 5 indicates that regional leaders may use a variety 
of means to “bring in” these votes. In turn, the different 
approaches can have very different implications for 
agricultural policy, growth and equity within the region 
concerned.
We note at least three main ways in which regional 
leaders can secure the votes of their ethnic group or 
region, although it can readily be seen that there are 
blurred boundaries between these:
•	 championing investment in public goods 
within their region, e.g. road infrastructure, 
research into crops or livestock that are 
prominent within the local economy 
•	 procuring “club goods” or transfers for people 
within their region, e.g. fertilizer subsidies,  
investment in irrigation infrastructure, 
leading to subsidized access to irrigation 
services. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) note 
that club goods are a “grey area” between 
programmatic politics and clientelism. They 
will tend to be indicative of clientelistic 
politics where their distribution within the 
region is characterized by high degrees of 
administrative discretion (hence, subject 
to manipulation for political ends) and of 
programmatic politics where there are clear 
(and enforced) rules for who gets what and 
why.
•	 disbursement of patronage to modest 
numbers of individuals within the region, 
some or all of whom then use their influence 
to “bring in” the votes of the wider population. 
The ability of these individuals to do this may 
in turn depend on social deference (within 
hierarchical social structures) or on other 
control mechanisms that are discussed 
further below and perhaps also on their 
ability to disburse further (small) quantities of 
patronage to others further down the chain.
A key element in the argument of Bates (1981) was 
that, whilst urban-oriented governments pursued 
policies that taxed the agricultural sector, they were 
able to “buy off” members of the rural elite through 
targeted subsidy and credit programmes. This robbed 
the rural majority of powerful leaders who could argue 
their case in government circles. This argument broadly 
fits with the second bullet (in its more clientelistic variant) 
above. By contrast, Nicolas van de Walle has argued that 
African leaders often disburse very little in the way of 
rents to the wider population, focusing on payments to 
individuals (the third bullet). Thus, van de Walle (2001) 
argued that “political authority in Africa is based on the 
giving and granting of favors, in an endless series of 
dyadic exchanges that go from the village level to the 
highest reaches of the central state” (p51). His insistence 
on the continued importance of prebendalism in Africa 
(van de Walle 2007) is also consistent with this.
Although referring to an earlier era (and strategies 
for state building rather than winning competitive 
elections), the impressive work of Boone (2003) leads 
us to expect considerable variation across groups within 
a  given country in terms of how much the general 
citizenry expect to receive from their leaders in exchange 
from their support. Where social groups are strongly 
hierarchical, few material benefits may need to reach 
the average group member for leaders to retain their 
positions. In more “democratic” social groups, the average 
group member may expect more tangible rewards for 
their ongoing support.
Anecdotally, in Kenya some Kikuyu argue that one of 
the reasons that they have historically done well from 
post-independence government policy is that Kikuyu 
are very demanding of their leaders. If a particular leader 
is not seen to deliver benefits to those s/he leads, then 
they will take whatever opportunity they can to replace 
him/her. By contrast, Luos are portrayed as following their 
political leaders with almost unquestioning loyalty. Of 
the major ethnic groupings in Kenya, Luos have arguably 
gained least from post-independence government policy. 
In Ghana World Bank 2007 argues that one of the reasons 
for reasonable performance on poverty reduction is that 
traditional leaderships are held accountable by both their 
subjects and higher political authorities (through the 
House of Chiefs). However, others, including Boone (2003), 
observe regional differences in this, with Akan groups 
in the south in general being much more demanding 
of their leaders than tribes in the north, which has so 
far largely been by-passed by poverty reduction trends.
One might thus hypothesise a relationship between 
regional policy outcomes on the one hand and both 
education levels (hence awareness of political processes) 
and population density on the other. Binswanger and 
Deininger (1997) suggest that civil society association 
and information exchange is easier in areas of higher 
population density, and that higher population density 
is thus likely to be associated with greater accountability 
of leaders to their supporters. However, whilst this would 
fit the stylized facts just presented for Ghana and central 
Kenya, it does not obviously fit the western Kenyan case. 
Local cultural differences cannot entirely be explained by 
measurable indicators such as education and population 
density.
Meanwhile, existing quantitative studies have tended 
to focus on the impact of a president coming from a 
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particular area. Thus, drawing on (1992) data on rates 
of taxation of five major cash crops across 30 African 
countries and capitalizing on the regional specificity of 
many of these crops, Kasara (2007) argues that “farmers in 
the president’s home area face higher tax rates than those 
outside of it” (p160). Because members of a particular 
ethnic group are pleased to have their “own man” in power, 
they may demand less in the way of policy prioritisation 
in return for their support, whereas other groups may 
require greater inducement to support him. By contrast, 
drawing on the more recent Distortions to Agricultural 
Incentives database10 , Bates and Block (2009) find that, 
whilst cash crops have generally been heavily taxed by 
African governments, the effect is reversed where the 
President comes from a major cash cropping region. They 
accept that wealthy regions, which are often associated 
with major cash crops (or mineral deposits), “may offer 
targets for those seeking resources to distribute to the 
poorer portions of the nation” (p6). However, Presidents 
from these regions are able to resist such pressures for 
redistributive taxation.
The other side of the phenomenon examined by 
Kasara (2007) is the phenomenon of swing voters, groups 
that are not closely allied to any of the main political 
parties or groupings in a country and whose preferences 
within a particular election may thus exert a decisive 
influence over the outcome. Because of their importance 
to the overall outcome of elections, swing voters may 
be able to extract more policy (or other) concessions 
from governments than voters in these governments’ 
support heartlands11 .
In somewhat different political contexts both Ghana 
(Central Region) and Kenya (the Luhya and groups in 
Eastern Province) have groups that are widely recognized 
as swing voters. However, in these two examples, 
developmental outcomes have been very different. Whilst 
leaders in Central Region in Ghana are seen to have used 
their traditional “swing” status (their allegiance going 
a long way to explaining different election outcomes 
in 2000, 2004 and 2008) to extract policy concessions 
that have benefited their region, there is a debate within 
Kenya as to why leaders in Eastern Province have not done 
this. One “conspiracy” theory is that influential Kikuyu 
politicians have blocked investments, most notably for 
road and irrigation development, that would benefit the 
region, because they know that horticultural and other 
products from Eastern would then undermine the market 
position of produce from Central Province in the Nairobi 
market. A competing theory is that local leaders in Eastern 
Province have done so well from their influence over 
repeated food aid distributions to the region (using this 
both to amass wealth and to consolidate their political 
power) that they have not acted as effective champions 
for their regions in the national policy arena.
Within the PEAPA case studies, the clearest example 
of power being obtained/maintained through the 
assembling of regional coalitions is Kenya. This can 
result in supportive policy for major crops grown 
within particular regions (the first bullet above), but 
generates few incentives for investment in national 
public goods such as agricultural extension. Thus, when 
President Kibaki came to power at the end of 2002, it 
was considered important to be seen early on to be 
supporting agriculture, so as to differentiate the new 
government from the later years of the Moi regime, when 
agriculture was neglected. A team of consultants was 
thus tasked with developing a Strategy for Revitalising 
Agriculture, which was unveiled by the President in 2004. 
The big themes of the strategy were twofold:
•	 firstly, removing the state from direct 
involvement in agricultural activities, so 
as to increase the space for the private 
sector to flourish (this was to be done, inter 
alia, through a dramatic rationalization 
of agriculture-related legislation, which 
provided for numerous redundant parastatal 
enterprises and also opportunities for state 
interventionism)
•	 secondly, focusing state efforts on enhanced 
provision of public goods, such as research 
and extension.
In practice, and despite strong initial donor support for 
the strategy, little progress has been made on any of its 
main elements since 2004. As an example, at least three 
major donor projects piloted alternative approaches to 
improving extension performance, but no effort was 
made to evaluate and compare them, so as to decide the 
way forward for the national extension system as a whole. 
Meanwhile, much effort was absorbed in simply trying 
to coordinate across agriculture and rural development 
ministries, which proliferated from three in 2003 to ten in 
2009 in a bid to sustain increasingly complex governing 
coalitions (Future Agricultures Consortium 2010).
Whilst little progress was made in the delivery of 
national public goods, however, swift action was taken 
to revitalize individual commodity sectors. An excellent 
example of this is the government’s re-acquisition and 
re-capitalisation of so-called new Kenya Cooperative 
Creameries, injecting additional intermediate demand 
into the milk market in competition with two private 
processors and bringing widespread benefits to 
producers in Central Province, the President’s home 
area (Atieno and Kanyinga 2008, Kenya case study 
forthcoming). This intervention was firmly in a Kenyan 
tradition of state intervention in regionally-focused 
commodity chains, but inconsistent with the emphasis 
of the Strategy for Revitalising Agriculture on reducing 
direct state involvement in the agriculture sector and 
focusing instead on provision of public goods12 .
In Burkina Faso, the major cotton producing zones in 
the south-west of the country are home to groups other 
than the main Mossi ethnic group (although plenty of 
Mossi have also moved there to grow cotton). Traditional 
authorities are weaker in this part of the country than 
in the Mossi areas, such that broad-based benefits have 
to be delivered in exchange for political support. This, 
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along with the importance of cotton to the Burkina 
macro-economy, is believed to have contributed to 
the relatively favourable policy that has made cotton in 
Burkina a widely recognized success story (Kaminski et 
al. 2009;Loada (2012)).
In Mozambique, the core support for the Frelimo 
government has tended to be based in the south of 
the country (around Maputo) and in the far north, 
with the central and northern regions, which have the 
highest agricultural potential, supporting the opposition 
Renamo. For much of the period since 1994 the approach 
of the Frelimo government to the agricultural sector can 
be described as “selected neglect”, contributing to the 
generally poor performance of the sector and limited 
progress in rural poverty reduction despite consistent 
macro-economic growth (do Rosário 2012). However, 
a counter-example is provided by the rehabilitation of 
the sugar sector, which over time has allowed Frelimo to 
make some inroads into a part of the country traditionally 
loyal to Renamo (Kjaer and Therkildsen 2011), whilst at 
the same time providing accumulation opportunities for 
members of the ruling elite.
Securing Support at Local Level
At village level in most African countries either 
traditional authorities or state-cum-party structures 
wield considerable authority and influence. The latter 
tend to be strongest where a post-independence 
government made a particular effort to challenge 
traditional authorities in the name of state building – 
either abolishing traditional authorities (and replacing 
them with a state organ) or constructing a parallel 
state apparatus to challenge their power. In the PEAPA 
countries, for example, traditional authorities remain 
strong in Burkina and Malawi, but were abolished and 
replaced by state-cum-party structures in Ethiopia and 
Tanzania. As already noted, a more even balance of power 
was struck in Ghana.
Local chiefs may exercise influence over populations 
within their areas through any of the following means 
(state officials tend to be limited to the first two):
•	 control over land access
•	 responsibility for distribution of external 
assistance (including fertiliser vouchers, 
choosing sites for NGOs to work in etc) 
•	 presiding over traditional courts
•	 deference and/or fear (spirit mediums for 
contacting ancestors). 
Often local chieftaincies are hereditary positions, but 
especially under multi-party politics, major efforts have 
been made by governments to secure chiefs’ loyalty, 
especially in areas where the government in question 
has not traditionally enjoyed support. One step up, where 
a chief is known to support an opposition party, resources 
may be steered away from that village. In Malawi, chiefs 
are now paid by the government and given (built) good 
houses. In return they are expected to use their influence 
to garner voting support for the government, using 
the carrots and sticks listed above (Chinsinga 2012). 
Suspected/known opposition supporters may find it 
hard to gain (additional) land or may be excluded from 
external assistance that is brought to the village or area. 
Opposition mobilisers may be denied the right to hold 
rallies in the village of a pro-government chief. Similarly, 
in Mozambique reforms instituted over the past decade 
have sought, inter alia, to ‘co-opt’ traditional authorities 
(historically strongly supportive of Renamo) by assigning 
them public roles such as revenue collection and forestry 
management.
Baldwin (2011) observes that, of the 19 countries 
within the 2008/09 Afrobarometer round 4 surveys, 
six passed legislation strengthening the powers of 
traditional authorities over land allocation. This reversed 
a post-independence trend to reduce the powers of 
traditional authorities. Baldwin (2011) hypothesises that 
the governments concerned decided to devolve powers 
to traditional authorities for political gain, related to the 
need to form and/or maintain multi-ethnic coalitions for 
the purpose of winning elections. Existing literature (such 
as Kasara 2007 and Boone 2003) indicates that there is 
no need to empower chiefs from the President or Prime 
Minister’s own ethnic group and no point in empowering 
chiefs of groups closely aligned with the opposition; 
hence chiefs from non-aligned groups are most likely to be 
favoured. Similarly, if the aim is to win votes, governments 
are most likely to look to empower chiefs of large and 
hierarchically organized groups. In regression analysis 
explaining the proportion of respondents who state that 
chiefs are primarily responsible for allocating land, the 
variable “Large Hierarchy without Political Alignment” 
is indeed found to be positive and significant, lending 
support to Baldwin 2011’s arguments that governments 
have sought to selectively empower chiefs in pursuit of 
electoral advantage.
Where traditional authorities were replaced by state-
cum-party structures, state and party were supposed 
to be separated with the advent of multi-party politics. 
However, this has not always happened. Thus, it is 
reported that the village chairman in most villages of 
Tanzania remains a supporter of CCM and continues to 
exert influence over (for example) all decisions on land 
allocation in the village.
Expected Impacts of 
Democratisation and the Role of 
Agricultural Policy
Few expect democratisation to overturn existing 
social and political relationships in the short-medium 
term. However, many do expect it to gradually alter the 
balance of power within these relationships, with the 
result that a greater share of resources and benefits 
within the economy eventually accrues to average rural 
voters. Thus, van de Walle (2007) expects prebendalism 
to gradually give way to other forms of patronage 
characterized by a somewhat wider distribution of rents, 
as democratization continues. Similarly, Kasara (2007) 
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argues that ethno-regional dynamics are likely to change 
with deepening democracy, weakening or reversing the 
central effect that she identifies (farmers in the president’s 
home area facing higher tax rates than those outside 
of it). Competitive elections present voters with more 
options, making it more difficult for a president to count 
on the support of his region if he offers few material 
benefits to the average voter (as opposed to political 
intermediaries) in return13 .
One may think of democratization gradually 
redistributing resources from an initial, highly centralized 
distribution,towards millions of dispersed rural 
households, i.e. an overall “centrifugal” effect. However, as 
already noted, there are plenty of political intermediaries 
along this chain from president to citizen and each of 
these may seek to retain an increased share of available 
resources, thereby reducing the share ultimately received 
by rural households14 . Thus, for example, in Tanzania 
district-level elites are perceived to be claiming an 
increasing share of the rents from central government 
programmes (agriculture and other) in exchange for 
their role in delivering votes for CCM at election time 
(Cooksey 2012).
The PEAPA country case studies suggest that wider 
distribution of resources to rural populations is unlikely 
to be the first response of an urban-based elite to greater 
political competition. Conversely, pro-smallholder 
agricultural policy may even be a last resort, if other 
options are not working. The Malawi fertilizer subsidy 
introduced in 2005 provides a striking example of a policy 
generating broad-based, poverty-reducing benefits to 
many rural households (Dorward and Chirwa 2011). In 
terms of the distinction drawn by Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
2007 regarding delivery of club goods, some attempt was 
made to establish rule-based allocation of the fertilizer 
vouchers, even though there was considerable local 
variation in how rules were applied (Dorward and Chirwa 
2011) and recommendations to tighten up the targeting 
criteria went unheeded over time. Grand patronage has 
almost certainly featured, too, although, in the early years 
at least, its extent was contained. The political story of this 
achievement is revealing, however. President Mutharika 
launched the subsidy programme having fallen out, in 
early 2005, with the UDF party that brought him to 
power. This forced him to seek parliamentary support 
from previously opposition MPs, but, more importantly, 
to find a way of making a broad-based appeal to voters 
before the 2009 election (Chinsinga 2007; 2012). This had 
to be done through bold policy, as he started without 
a party machinery at his disposal. At the same time as 
championing the fertilizer subsidy, however, he also 
courted traditional chiefs, as noted above. The subsidy 
programme is widely credited with securing Mutharika a 
landslide victory in the 2009 election. However, with his 
position secure, a two-term limit on his tenure as president 
and with social control mechanisms in place at local level, 
the quality of policy making has took a dramatic turn for 
the worse following that election. Thus, far from signaling 
a decisive shift towards programmatic politics or even a 
Malawian “developmental state”, the subsidy programme 
could be seen as an opportunistic policy move by a leader 
without reliable alternative mechanisms for securing 
votes – a “window of opportunity” for pro-poor policy 
(Chinsinga 2012).
Nevertheless, given the number of people who derive 
some of their livelihood from agriculture (directly or 
indirectly) in Africa, one might expect the agricultural 
sector to gain increased prominence in national politics 
and policy making as a result of the “centrifugal” forces 
released by democratization. As already noted, this 
may well be one of the reasons why African Heads of 
State, assembled in Maputo in July 2003, declared their 
commitment “to adopt sound policies for agricultural and 
rural development, and … to allocating at least 10% of 
national budgetary resources for their implementation 
within five years” (Assembly of the African Union 2003, 
p1) – the limited progress in achieving this commitment 
in subsequent years (Fan et al. 2009) notwithstanding.
However, given the obstacles to moving to 
programmatic politics focused on appeals to national 
electorates, one should perhaps not expect a strong 
emphasis on the provision of public goods to support 
agricultural growth. This is reinforced by issues specific to 
the classic national agricultural public goods, investment 
in research and extension. Whilst some governments in 
recent years have seen improved extension performance 
as a way of signaling to rural voters that they can deliver, 
Future Agricultures Consortium (2009a) argues that five-
year political cycles tend only to encourage short-term 
measures to improve performance (a bit more money, 
some top-down incentives to increase effort), rather 
than the more difficult, systemic reforms that would 
be necessary to generate sustained improvements in 
service coverage, quality and accountability. Investment 
in research suffers from the same problem, exacerbated 
by the fact that the outcomes of research effort cannot 
be confidently predicted in advance.
Rather, following Figure 5, one should perhaps expect 
a renewed interest in the provision of club goods and 
transfers, compatible with political systems that are still 
fundamentally clientelistic. Fertiliser and other subsidies 
are an obvious example here. In Mozambique Frelimo 
suffered a significant electoral setback in 1999 that 
ultimately led to a change in party leadership after 
an internal power struggle. In response the current 
President Guebuza has placed much greater emphasis 
on support to agriculture, including championing a new 
food production programme (PAPA). However, in many 
ways this is a platform for distributing agricultural inputs 
and machinery across selected rural districts, many of 
which are opposition party districts. Moreover, in line 
with an argument above, the actions that are felt to have 
contributed most to his re-election in 2004 are those that 
have sought to reassert party control at decentralized 
level, e.g. establishment of district development funds 
and overtures to traditional authorities (do Rosário 2012).
As already observed, the agroecological diversity 
of many African countries makes agricultural policy 
particularly well suited to political systems where power 
Working Paper 043 www.future-agricultures.org16
is obtained by constructing coalitions of multiple regional 
and ethnic groups. As Kasara (2007) rightly observes, 
“major” agricultural crops - and indeed livestock 
systems, both dairy and pastoralist, and fisheries! – 
are often concentrated in particular regions, and in 
turn are associated with the particular ethnic groups 
that predominate in those regions. Hence, policy to 
promote a given crop primarily benefits the inhabitants 
of a particular region, so can form (part of ) the offer to 
members of a particular ethnic group(s) to join a political 
coalition. As democratisation moves politics away from 
prebendalism and political control strategies towards 
forms of patronage that distribute resources more widely 
amongst rural populations, regionally-based agricultural 
policy is likely to be a popular tool for securing voting 
support.
Agricultural policy may be a popular tool for securing 
voting support for another reason, too. van de Walle 
(2007) argues that one of the reasons why prebendalism 
has been slow to give way to other forms of clientelism in 
much of Africa is because donors micro-manage the use 
of such a large share of the so-called development budget 
of African governments (which they supply). Hence, 
the scope for broad-based patronage disbursement (as 
opposed to grand corruption) is limited. This argument 
may well overstate the effectiveness of donor monitoring. 
However, what it does do is highlight an important 
difference between health and education sectors, 
where donors have poured considerable resources in 
support of key Millennium Development Goals, and 
the agricultural sector. In the former, there are limited 
grounds for prioritizing investments in particular regions 
of a country (localized disease incidence or relative 
historical neglect being two possible candidates). By 
contrast, in agriculture, delivery of club goods to satisfy 
a regional voting base can be dressed in the respectable 
terms of policy towards a particular strategic commodity 
sector.
Before moving on, we note a couple of possible caveats 
to this argument. The first is that regional specificity may 
hold less true for staple food crops than for major cash 
crops, especially where past policies have accustomised 
entire populations to a particular staple (most notably 
maize in southern and eastern Africa). However, even 
here there may be important divergences of interest 
between producers of regular surpluses, who may be 
geographically concentrated for agro-ecological reasons 
(e.g. Southern Highlands in Tanzania, Rift Valley Province 
in Kenya), and the majority of households who are 
net food deficit (Weber et al. 1988). Thus, Kenya is an 
extremely diverse country agro-ecologically and maize 
surpluses are highly concentrated in a small number of 
districts with above-average farm sizes within Rift Valley 
Province (Nyoro et al. 1999). The main ethnic group in 
these districts is the Kalenjin. Ever since President Moi 
(himself a Kalenjin) used national response to the 1980 
drought to establish a dense network of buying posts 
for surplus maize within the Rift Valley (Bates 1989), 
Kenyan maize policy has provided rents to the producers 
in these surplus districts through highly attractive into-
store prices, accompanied by credit access for input 
purchase and extension support. Effectively, therefore, 
maize policy has been pursued as a regional policy, to 
the detriment of the majority of the population, both 
urban and rural, who rely on purchasing maize and so 
benefit from low prices. Strikingly, since the overthrow 
of President Moi, all three Ministers of Agriculture have 
been Kalenjins, a succession that has survived national 
corruption scandals at the ministry and arguably has 
allowed the pro-Rift Valley maize policies to be sustained.
The second caveat is that some countries are less 
heterogeneous agro-ecologically than others. Thus, 
although Malawianists will elucidate the local agro-
ecological variations within Malawi, the country is 
fairly homogeneous both agro-ecologically and socio-
economically relative to many other African countries. 
Maize is the dominant crop throughout most of the 
country and, despite devoting a significant share of 
their land to it, the majority of land-scarce smallholder 
households in all regions of the country are net food 
deficit. This makes policy supporting maize production 
by resource-poor households a genuinely national policy; 
hence why the fertilizer subsidy was an attractive option 
to the isolated President Mutharika in 2005.
4. Appointment of 
Ministers
One of the characteristics of a presidential political 
system is that it is the President who appoints cabinet 
ministers, although rules differ as to who (if anyone) has 
to approve these nominees (see below). Following the 
logic that “mandate” is important, the basis on which 
ministers are chosen should influence their incentives 
for performance once selected. Naively, one might think 
that capability to run a ministry well should be a primary 
criterion for selecting a minister. However, African 
governments are replete with examples of ministers who 
have performed poorly running one ministry, but, instead 
of being dropped from the position of minister, have 
instead been moved sideways to another ministry (often 
on several occasions!). This suggests that a different logic 
is at work.
The earlier discussion on how the president is chosen 
provides a useful way in. Where a presidential majority 
is obtained by assembling a coalition of regional voting 
blocs, then ministers are likely to be leaders within their 
regions whom the president can rely upon to bring in 
the regional vote at election time – or during referenda, 
where applicable. This seems a reasonable summary of 
the situation in Kenya, for example. Where this is the 
case, the incentives for strong performance in running 
the ministry are immediately weakened, as the “bottom 
line” is that one’s tenure as minister does not depend 
primarily on ministry performance, but on ability to bring 
in the regional voting bloc.
What is perhaps more controversial, but fits with the 
“prebendalist” arguments of van de Walle (2007), is that 
a minister may be given a ministry in part (more or less 
large!) as a source of patronage to keep the regional 
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voting bloc happy and supportive. This is consistent 
with the observations regarding maize policy in Kenya 
over the past decade.
Note that, as per the previous section, the minister 
could in theory still pursue a number of strategies to 
bring in the regional vote. Indicators of a clientelistic 
approach might include: high profile “transfer” policies 
(e.g. fertilizer subsidy) designed and managed such that 
there is plenty of rationing and discretion over who 
actually receives the transfer; a disproportionate share 
of donor and other projects being directed towards the 
targeted region; large divergence between budgeted 
and actual expenditure within the ministry, plus weak 
accounting; a high level of corruption in contracting, 
asset sales etc. By contrast, a policy-based appeal could 
be associated with much greater transparency, but the 
benefit incidence would still fall heavily on the targeted 
region(s).
If ministries are indeed distributed at least in part as 
a source of patronage, then this reinforces the impact of 
ministerial selection criteria on performance incentives. 
The President’s power to demand improved performance 
from a particular minister (if the ministry in question is 
giving the government a bad name, for example) may 
actually be quite circumscribed. Furthermore, the onset 
of democratization may have exacerbated this situation: 
whereas an autocrat may enjoy some freedom to sack 
ministers, a minister with a strong following in his or 
her home region in a young democracy might enjoy a 
fair degree of bargaining power with the president. This 
may be one of the reasons why Rock (2009) finds an 
inverted “U-shaped” relationship between corruption 
and democracy, with corruption initially getting worse 
during democratization - due to a collapse in discipline – 
and only improving as institutional restraints on political 
behaviour are gradually introduced to counter-balance 
this tendency15 .
As an example of (attempted) institutional restraints, 
the new Kenyan constitution approved in 2010 requires 
that ministerial appointments gain approval from 
parliament, a requirement that was not present in the 
previous constitution. This “restraint” does not change the 
logic of ministerial candidates being selected on the basis 
of their position as regional leaders and opinion formers. 
However, it does mean that those selected may also have 
to demonstrate some capability to run a ministry well 
and this should restrict the “degrees of freedom” that they 
enjoy in running the ministry for political ends.
So far this section has considered the incentives facing 
Ministers in running their own ministries. However, it is 
worth remembering that many African governments are 
coalitions and that these coalitions may become very 
strained once the initial objective of gaining power has 
been achieved. In this context, and with the next election 
in mind, senior figures in one part of a coalition may 
actively seek to block implementation of a policy that is 
likely to be associated with another part of the coalition 
in the minds of the electorate, so that their future rivals 
do not gain an advantage at the ballot box. This sort of 
stalemate – observed in Kenya after 2005 – can contribute 
to the policy inertia discussed in relation to Table 1.
Finally, it should be noted that the same basic selection 
considerations and performance incentives that have just 
been described for ministers also apply for senior civil 
servants, where these are Presidential appointments. van 
de Walle (2001) argues persuasively that the politicization 
of the bureaucracy through the extension of the principle 
of Presidential appointments deeper into the civil service 
has been a major cause of the observed decline in state 
capacity in Africa in recent decades. According to van 
de Walle (2001), this decline was first widely observed 
around the time of structural adjustment, but in fact 
started before this – indeed, in the first few years after 
independence.
5. Voting for MPs
In a Presidential system the theoretical role of the 
legislature is to:
1.shape and pass laws
2.hold the executive (President and Ministers) to   
account for their actions and performance.
In addition, under all voting systems other than pure 
proportional representation, members of parliament are 
also elected to represent particular constituencies, so are 
also expected by their constituents to represents their 
particular local interests. This could include:
•	 promoting (or opposing) legislation that 
is beneficial (or detrimental) to their local 
economy or interests
•	 lobbying for both public and private 
investment to be directed to their 
constituency. This role fits neatly within a 
clientelistic system, although under the name 
“pork barrel politics” it is also a well-known 
feature of so-called mature democratic 
political systems (e.g. the US).
Few would dispute the benefits to economic growth 
over the medium-long term if parliamentarians focus 
their energies on passing good quality legislation and 
holding the executive to account for their actions and 
performance, rather than lobbying for local investments 
and favours. These benefits are likely to come from well-
chosen public investment in national public goods, as 
well as from increased private investment stimulated 
by a high quality policy environment. High levels of 
performance by ministries, resulting from effective 
accountability mechanisms, are themselves a public 
good. Unfortunately, African MPs are rarely elected 
for their capacity to shape national policy or hold the 
executive to account. Rather, literature suggests that local 
and/or personal consideration predominate when MPs 
are selected.
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Leonard et al. 2009’s brief summary of rural patron-
client relationships summarises the relationship between 
MP and voters as follows: given the high levels of climate 
and other risk associated with predominantly agricultural 
livelihoods in poor contexts, patrons (in this case MPs) 
are expected to provide insurance cover for poor clients 
(in this case, voters) in exchange for political and other 
forms of support. According to Leonard et al. (2009), 
as clients have few other ways of coping with risk and 
limited alternative means of insuring themselves, the 
terms of this “contract” can be highly adverse to the client. 
In particular, MPs may abuse the political support that 
they receive from voters by going to the capital (e.g. 
parliament) and promoting or supporting policies 
that actually contribute to keeping their clients in their 
poverty. This may even be in the patron’s interest, as poor 
clients will continue to offer their support in return for 
very limited insurance benefits, and the clients are likely 
to be almost completely ignorant of the patron’s activities 
or their consequences. This narrative suggests that rural 
voters receive occasional personal transfers plus some 
promises of local public goods in exchange for their votes 
– not supportive policies.
Alternative arguments stress low education of voters, 
combined with lack of information on voting patterns, 
whilst placing less emphasis on the patron-client 
relationship as an insurance substitute. Hence, voters who 
are ill-equipped to assess arguments about the merits 
and demerits of (some) alternative policy proposals and 
who anyway find it hard to access information about 
voting behaviour, may instead focus on performance 
that they can observe for themselves, i.e. how effective 
has their MP been in providing local public goods (and 
perhaps also personal assistance) to their area?
Figure 6 presents data from the 2009 round of 
Afrobarometer surveys suggesting that voters expect 
their MPs to focus first and foremost on local development 
issues16 . In all countries except Malawi and Tanzania, 
urban respondents gave a slightly higher priority to MPs’ 
national role than rural respondents. However, even in 
urban areas the vast majority of respondents prioritized 
local needs in all of the six PEAPA countries covered, with 
the exception of Burkina Faso.
Young 2009’s study of Kenya and Zambia finds no 
evidence that distribution of private goods might help 
MPs win elections, but does find “suggestive, though 
not overwhelming, evidence that an MP’s presence in 
their electoral constituencies impresses voters” (p8). 
Meanwhile, Twaweza (2010) examined the re-selection 
or de-selection of sitting CCM MPs in primary elections 
within the party prior to the 2010 general election in 
Tanzania in relation to their degree of activity within the 
19 sessions of the Bunge (parliament) since the previous 
election in 2005. They found that the ten least active MPs 
were all re-selected whilst seven of the ten most active 
were de-selected. A likely explanation for this is that those 
MPs who engaged heavily in national legislative activities 
were perceived as insufficiently focused on constituency 
issues by local party members.
In this context the spread of constituency development 
funds (CDFs) as an adjunct to democratisation is readily 
understood. There is anecdotal evidence that diligence 
and largesse in promoting local development through 
CDFs is emerging as a major issue in the outcome of 
elections at constituency level. This suggests that voters 
are not as dependent on their MPs as a pessimistic take 
on the Leonard et al. (2009) argument might indicate. 
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Nevertheless, the lack of attention to MPs’ national 
roles means that the lack of upward accountability 
for performance of ministers to presidents (discussed 
above) is mirrored by a lack of accountability for ministry 
performance to voters via Parliament.
One study that offers a dissenting view is Lindberg 
(2011), drawing on a survey of around 1600 people 
conducted in ten constituencies in Ghana shortly before 
the 2008 elections. Whilst respondents stated that the 
main tasks of MPs were constituency service (almost 
70%) or provision of personal support (15%), rather than 
legislative oversight (only 8%), Lindberg 2011’s analysis of 
voting intentions shows that, “controlling for perceptions 
of how well the government (i.e. the president and his 
ministers) have done in terms of policies, and controlling 
for the respondent’s perception of how well the country’s 
economy has done in the last 12 months, the effect of the 
MP’s contribution in terms of small-scale club goods and 
the support in terms of private goods to an individual 
respondent, is nil” (p13)17 .
The combined arguments of this section and the 
previous one are of enormous practical significance 
for the performance of African ministries of agriculture 
and hence for the likelihood that investment in the 
infrastructural and institutional public goods needed to 
support smallholder-led agricultural growth will indeed 
occur. In particular, policy and coordination to ensure 
provision of multiple support services is a technically 
challenging task (Poulton et al. 2010). Government 
agencies are only likely to persevere with this until they 
get it right if they face strong performance incentives 
to do so.
6. Sources of More 
Positive Agricultural 
Policy
Thus far the paper has examined the incentives for 
agricultural policy arising from democratizing political 
systems in Africa. The basic conclusion is that incentives 
for broad-based, pro-smallholder agricultural policy 
remain weak, despite the rural majority receiving the 
vote in presidential, parliamentary and sometimes 
also local elections. Potential sources of heightened 
incentives include policy competition between more 
or less programmatic parties (Ghana?) and the ability 
of some groups (e.g. within Kenya, Burkina?) to demand 
reasonably broad-based distribution of rents in exchange 
for their support for political coalitions. However, these 
cases are the exception, rather than the rule, and/or 
remain subject to debate. Therefore, as in the analysis 
of Bates (1981), the major commonality is a “negative”: 
heavy taxation of agriculture is no longer the dominant 
issue, but weak performance incentives for Ministries of 
Agriculture and weak political incentives for investment 
in public goods are both serious issues when the state 
has an important role to play in creating the conditions 
for private market development and in enabling poor 
smallholders to participate. 
In the final chapter of his book, Bates (1981) examined 
factors that could contribute to a more positive outcome 
(i.e. lower agricultural taxation) than in his principal 
narrative. In a similar vein, this final section considers two 
factors that are observed to increase political incentives 
for pro-smallholder agricultural policy within the PEAPA 
case studies. The commonality across these two factors is 
that they establish some alignment between the interests 
of elites and rural populations.
Dependence on Agriculture
Bates (1981) argued that the availability of 
non-agricultural resources, especially minerals, within 
an economy provided an alternative source of tax 
revenue and, therefore, reduced the perceived need to 
tax agricultural exports heavily. On the other hand, it also 
provided an additional source of foreign exchange and, 
therefore, allowed governments to import (subsidised) 
food products, potentially compounding a negative 
effect on domestic producers of agricultural importables 
through overvaluation of the exchange rate. Availability 
of non-agricultural resources could thus have a mixed 
effect on agricultural policy.
In an era when performance incentives for Ministries 
of Agriculture and political incentives for investment in 
public goods are more serious issues than agricultural 
taxation, comparison across PEAPA countries suggests 
that availability of non-agricultural resources, especially 
minerals, within an economy may be bad for agricultural 
policy, the additional state revenue available for 
agricultural investment notwithstanding. The argument 
is as follows: insofar as elites are insulated from pressure 
from rural interest groups (“autonomous”, to quote van 
de Walle 2001), tax revenue and foreign exchange from 
minerals and other non-agricultural resources allows 
them to pursue their own consumption and investment 
priorities without paying much attention to the plight 
of agriculture. By contrast, where an economy is highly 
dependent on the performance of the agricultural 
sector for these things, even an urban-based elite tends 
to realize that it cannot afford to neglect the sector if 
it wishes to generate resources for its own activities, 
whether these be public (investments in other sectors) 
or private (campaigning for re-election).
Figure 7 illustrates the relative dependence of the 
economies in the PEAPA study on agriculture as a 
source of foreign exchange. This shows that Burkina, 
Ethiopia and Malawi are the most heavily dependent 
on agriculture. In all three countries, policy makers have 
historically paid considerable attention to the fortunes 
of the agricultural sector, knowing that there are few 
other sources of wealth, including for the elite, in the 
country (see especially Loada 2012). According to Fan 
et al. (2009) (and as illustrated in Figure 4), all three of 
these countries featured in the short list of eight African 
countries that devoted at least 10% of their national 
budget to agricultural investment in 2007. By contrast, 
in both Mozambique and Tanzania, which are much less 
dependent on agricultural exports, a sustained period 
of relatively rapid macroeconomic growth has failed to 
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make much, if any, impact on rural poverty figures (Table 
2), supporting the argument that agricultural policy has 
been relatively neglected amongst elite concerns.
Perceived Threats to 
Continuation of the Regime
A military threat to a regime may endanger elites as 
well as the poor - thereby creating some alignment in 
the interests of elites and citizenry19 . Moreover, military 
threats can force rulers to depend more heavily on 
citizens for taxation for national defence, once alternative 
sources of revenue are exhausted. As the 18th century 
American colonists realized (succinctly expressed as, 
“No taxation without representation”), citizens can then 
demand political or economic concessions in return for 
greater taxation. A military threat may also emerge in 
part because a regime neglects large sections of its rural 
population, who are thus willing to provide refuge and 
perhaps other types of support to armed groups seeking 
to overthrow the regime, not to mention directly swelling 
their ranks with young combatants.               
According to Campos and Root (1996), the huge 
Communist threat throughout East Asia in the 1950s 
and 1960s created the political incentives for the rapid 
economic growth experienced by South Korea and 
Taiwan starting in the 1960s. The external threat was 
particularly acute for both South Korea and Taiwan, but 
in addition there was some internal sympathy for the 
Communist cause within both states (along with others 
in East and South-east Asia). In both countries agrarian 
reform was one of the first major policy acts, designed to 
increase the number of rural dwellers with their own stake 
in the land and to demonstrate an attractive alternative 
to collective ownership of assets. Leaders realized that 
an interventionist state was desirable to stimulate the 
rapid growth needed to generate resources for defence. 
However, the state also had to be as efficient as possible, 
which led to an effective, outcome-based management 
of the bureaucracy, along with clear and enforced 
performance targets for enterprises seeking support 
from the state (Stiglitz 1996; Khan 2000). Meanwhile, 
rapid growth implied sacrifices (most notably, a very high 
savings rate), so it was imperative that growth was as 
broad-based as possible. In a low-income context, broad-
based growth typically means investment in smallholder 
agriculture alongside stimulation of investment in 
labour-intensive manufacturing that gradually pulls 
labour out of the agricultural sector (Mellor 1986; Timmer 
2009). This enabled the government to keep enough of 
its citizens “on side”, despite significant restrictions on 
political freedom, and enabled it to gradually win over 
Communist sympathizers.
Whereas democratization may be thought of, in theory 
(and perhaps in the long term), as strengthening the 
bargaining position of the rural poor within an elite-
dominated political system, the possibility of a military 
threat linked to rural dissatisfaction with regime policy 
may be thought of as raising the “reservation position” of 
the rural population in political calculations, even in the 
absence of any direct say in government policy making. 
 Within the PEAPA study, two countries that face 
circumstances analogous to those experienced by 
1950s and 1960s South Korea and Taiwan are Rwanda 
and Ethiopia. In Rwanda a government centred on the 
Tutsi-dominated RPF continues to be confronted by Hutu 
rebel groups just across its borders whilst governing a 
population that is majority Hutu. It continually needs to 
generate resources for defence (a short-term imperative), 
but it also faces major long-term challenges. The first of 
these is to prevent the country from slipping back into 
the type of devastating ethnic violence that erupted in 
1994. The second is that it cannot win an election under 
full political liberalisation20  as long as voting preferences 
are determined primarily by ethnic allegiances. Whilst it 
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can resort to political control for some time, this will only 
get more difficult as time goes on. Its economic strategy, 
therefore, is to push for rapid and broad-based growth, 
much as South Korea and Taiwan did. This includes the 
recent emphasis on agriculture and – in the absence of 
credible manufacturing options in a small landlocked 
country (Collier 2007) – internet-based service industries, 
requiring major investment in both infrastructure and 
education.
The logic seems to be that, if enough people benefit 
from growth and gain a sufficient stake in economic 
prosperity, then eventually elections will be fought on 
the basis of policy, rather than ethnicity21 , as voters 
recognize the cost of a return to ethnic conflict. The 
present government should then stand a good chance 
of winning even if electoral rules are liberalised.
The imperative of sustained growth – looking beyond 
a single electoral cycle, but nevertheless to be achieved as 
rapidly as possible - in turn creates incentives for systemic 
reforms in areas where neighbouring governments 
may only tinker superficially, e.g. agricultural support 
services. As in South Korea and Taiwan, outcome-based 
management of the bureaucracy is being developed 
to enhance the efficiency with which state agencies 
perform their roles – encouraged, inter alia, by the 
annual cabinet retreat and Annual National Dialogue. 
All this said, agricultural policy received relatively low 
priority in the first decade of RPF-led rule after 1994. It 
was only after the shock of two poor harvests in 2003-04 
that it rose up the agenda. Since then, efforts to make 
up for lost time have been impressive and include a 
programme for distributing subsidized inputs, promotion 
of synchronised planting and harvesting by smallholders 
in (service) cooperatives, irrigation of under-utilised 
marshlands (especially for rice), promotion of sound 
intensification principles by extension staff and the 
promotion of a national ‘one cow per family’ policy. A 
feature of agricultural policy making in Rwanda, which 
should not be unusual in Africa but is, is that it appears 
to learn from past mistakes (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 
2012), which is evidence of a regime that it knows it has 
to perform.
It is not the place of this paper to comment on the 
overall strategy of the Rwandan government, which is 
both bold and controversial in a number of respects. 
Rather, the much narrower intention is to illustrate how a 
combination of external and internal threats to a regime 
can shape the performance incentives that it faces. One 
might also note that, when an external threat does shape 
incentives for state performance, the agriculture sector 
will often benefit from increased investment and more 
supportive policy, due to its irreplaceable role in broad-
based growth. However, it is not only the agricultural 
sector that benefits. Rather, the entire state system is 
subject to the increased performance incentives and a 
predictable outcome of this is that more rapid growth 
will hasten the structural transformation of the economy 
that will eventually reduce the relative importance of the 
agricultural sector (Timmer 2009).
Meanwhile, in Ethiopia the long-standing imperial 
and military (communist) regimes were eventually 
both overthrown by force, in part made possible by the 
disaffection of rural populations with the unfavourable 
agricultural policies inflicted upon them. Having itself 
capitalized on such disaffection, the current EPRDF 
regime knows that it neglects agriculture at its peril. It also 
faces considerable opposition itself – both external (from 
Eritrea and Somalia) and internal; mainstream political 
and armed insurgency (Ogaden National Liberation 
Front and Oromo Liberation Front); ethno-nationalist 
and pan-Ethiopian - and knows that its core support 
base is limited, both numerically and territorially. Under 
such circumstances, the regime has sought to maintain 
tight political control, a strategy that cannot be sustained 
indefinitely. It knows that it only really has one way out 
of its predicament in the longer term: namely, to achieve 
greater legitimacy through delivering broad-based 
growth. This has translated into persistent efforts to 
support smallholder producers (recent efforts to also 
attract large-scale farming notwithstanding), including 
significant investment in the classic public good, the 
national agricultural extension service (Berhanu 2012). 
However, the large and diverse nature of Ethiopia makes 
it much more difficult to achieve rapid change than in 
the smaller and culturally more homogeneous (and 
historically “disciplined”) Rwanda. At the same time, the 
short-term need of the Ethiopian regime to maintain 
political control means that the extension service 
performs a dual economic and political role, something 
that may reduce the efficiency of some of the investment 
made in it (Berhanu 2012).
Finally, it should be noted that, whilst an existential 
threat to a regime may lead to improved agricultural 
policy, this is not inevitable. Indeed, many African 
countries have experienced civil war and some face 
the danger of sliding back into it (Collier 2007), but 
this has not necessarily led to a revolution in policy 
making. This is where leadership comes in, along with 
the ability of elite groups to negotiate a developmental 
“political settlement” or “elite bargain” (Di John and 
Putzel 2009) in response to challenging circumstances. 
Thus, in Rwanda, President Kagame has succeeded in 
persuading a large enough proportion of the national 
military and civilian elite (the current selectorate?) to 
unite behind his bold vision of national economic and 
social transformation, even to the extent of sacrificing 
some of their “entitlement” to short-term reward from 
holding public office, i.e. restraining personal corruption 
and resisting other forms of rent-seeking (Booth and 
Golooba-Mutebi 2012; see also Appendix A5)22 .
7. Concluding Remarks
The political economy of agricultural policy in Africa 
has received insufficient attention (certainly in terms of 
multi-country comparative studies) since the seminal 
work of Bates (1981). In the intervening period, important 
elements of the policy and political environment have 
changed. Domestic policy bias against the agricultural 
sector has declined as a result of structural adjustment 
policies, in the process changing the single major feature 
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of African agricultural policy that Bates (1981) sought to 
explain. Meanwhile, competitive multi-party politics have 
now been a feature of many African countries for 15 years 
or more, generating the potential for rural preferences to 
exert increasing influence over national policy choices.
This paper has presented elements of a framework 
for the political economy analysis of African agricultural 
policy. A key assumption is the importance of “mandate”; 
in other words, that an examination of how policy makers 
are selected will shed important light on the policy 
priorities that they will pursue once in office. The paper 
has examined the selection of presidents, ministers and 
MPs, attempting to draw implications for agricultural 
policy, given the preponderance of rural dwellers 
(with a greater or lesser degree of dependence on the 
agricultural sector for their livelihoods) in most African 
populations. It has considered the challenges confronting 
the emergence of programmatic politics in many African 
countries and thus explained why African politics is often 
based on the formation of regional coalitions.
Agricultural policy fits neatly into a regionally-based 
politics because of the agro-ecological basis of agricultural 
activity, in contrast to the relative standardization of 
education and health service delivery across geographic 
space. An important issue deserving further attention 
is how voting majorities are obtained within particular 
regions, as this affects the prospects for policies that are 
supportive of smallholder (i.e. broad-based) agricultural 
growth. As democratisation gradually increases the 
distribution of rents from national elite to average citizen, 
agricultural policy can be expected to be an important 
vehicle for this. However, the argument of this paper is 
that one should not expect a strong emphasis on the 
provision of public goods to support agricultural growth 
as a result of this, but rather a renewed interest in the 
provision of club goods and transfers, compatible with 
political systems that are still fundamentally clientelistic.
Finally, the paper considered additional influences 
on policy making that could generate more positive 
incentives for agricultural policy, through the (partial) 
alignment of the interests of the political elite and 
poor rural households. Within the PEAPA case study 
countries, macro-economic dependence on agriculture 
and existential threats to regime survival create some of 
the strongest incentives for pro-smallholder agricultural 
policy, including encouraging reform of public agencies 
and public agricultural service provision (i.e. public 
goods). The bad news for those seeking to improve 
agricultural policy making in Africa is that the factors that 
create strong state incentives to perform are essentially 
“exogenous”.
Whilst future work within the PEAPA project will 
explore the policy implications of these findings, at this 
stage we note the following:
•	 For donors, recognizing and seeking to 
work with, rather than against, domestic 
political incentives is important if impact 
is to be seen beyond “pilot” projects. As the 
discussion in section 3 highlighted, there 
may be opportunities to support pro-poor 
change in some commodity sectors within a 
country even when there is limited scope for 
enhancing delivery of national public goods. 
Conversely, conditions conducive to strong 
incentives for state performance in national 
agricultural policy may also be associated 
with imperatives towards political control. 
Thus, donors will have to make judgements as 
to how far to support and how far to critique 
both individual policy initiatives and the 
wider political strategy of which they are part.
•	 In contexts where political incentives for 
pro-smallholder agricultural policy are 
currently weak, key questions concern the 
role that civil society actors can play in 
changing this state of affairs and the timescale 
over which investments to build the capacity 
of such actors may be expected to yield 
results. Section 3 noted the weak demand 
for programmatic politics. Applying this to 
pro-poor agricultural policy, a smallholder 
in one part of (say) Kenya feels less affinity 
with another smallholder of similar socio-
economic status in another part of the 
country than with an elite member of his or 
her own ethnic group. Can civil society-led 
awareness and advocacy campaigns begin 
to change this and, if so, how quickly? In 
Latin America mobilization of poor groups 
by diverse social movements (Vanden 2007) 
arguably began to exert an influence on 
electoral outcomes around 15 years after 
the return to democracy. However, there 
are various reasons why such mobilization 
might take much longer to achieve in much 
of Sub-Saharan Africa than in Latin America, 
including deeper levels of absolute poverty, 
lower education levels (although recent 
increases in school enrolment are a positive 
sign in this respect) and little prior history of 
awareness raising amongst the rural poor in 
Africa (some early cooperative development 
activity aside). 
Encouraging macroeconomic growth notwithstanding, 
the road to rural poverty reduction in parts of Africa could 
still be a long one.
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END NOTES
1 Indeed, whilst Anderson and Masters 2009 report 
that there is room for further progress on pricing 
in some countries, there are also problems with 
some of the underlying data used to calculate 
distortions, which tend to overstate the amount of 
anti-agricultural bias still remaining (Delpeuch and 
Poulton 2011).
2   This emphasis on (lack of ) investment in public 
goods should not be read as a dismissal of the 
potential role that input subsidies, which are 
transfers, can play in stimulating smallholder 
agricultural growth. As Dorward et al. 2004 explain, 
these were an important component of policy to 
stimulate agricultural growth in Asia during the 
Green Revolution era. However, then as now, 
subsidies need to be combined with investments 
in rural road and irrigation infrastructure, research 
and extension, interventions to assist smallholders 
cope with price and other risks, and policy 
coordination if they are to lead to sustained 
transformation of smallholder agricultural 
production.
3        Identifying donors as rational-legal agents is not 
an entirely uncontroversial position. A radical 
critique of donor agencies might portray them as 
instruments of foreign or commercial policy, 
opening new markets to international capital (see, 
for example, Perkins 2005). A related criticism of 
the neo-patrimonial concept, and hence of the 
simplified portrayal of scenarios in Table 1, is that 
a given individual – especially a senior figure within 
a ministry – may both ascribe to technocratic ideals 
whilst finding him/herself subject to strong political 
pressures. S/he may act largely according to 
technocratic logic in one situation but bow to 
political pressure in another.
4 Of course, the tension between stated public policy 
objectives and the requirements for retaining 
power exists in all states, not just African ones. It is 
perceived as acute within African states because 
(as will be discussed below), in many African states 
retaining power requires that a government gains 
the support of key local leaders and “opinion 
formers”. The policies that are useful in gaining the 
support of such people are often not those that 
flow from official public policy objectives, as local 
leaders and “opinion formers” are typically not poor. 
(Contrast this with a “pure” democratic model where 
stated public policy objectives and the requirements 
for retaining power are aligned through the 
exchange of policies for votes). In addition, in poor 
countries with relatively small states (measured by 
the ratio of tax revenue to GDP), leaders are more 
likely to resort to reallocation of property rights 
and to extra-legal measures (corruption) to buy the 
support of important “opinion formers” than they 
are in developed economies, where political 
competition can focus on the legitimate sources 
for and distribution of the budget (Khan 2005).
5  D e m o c rat i s at i o n  m ay  a l s o  e n co m p a s s 
decentralisation reforms, insofar as they are 
intended to give local people greater control over 
the services that they receive from the state, but 
these are not the focus of this paper.
 6 The degree of political competition is measured 
using the Executive Index of  Electoral 
Competitiveness (EIEC) which “measures the level 
of competition that occurs during the executive 
selection process” (p9). Countries are scored on a 
scale of 1-7 and Bates and Block 2009 consider 
countries scoring 6 or 7 to be politically competitive. 
This requires that candidates from more than one 
party compete in executive elections, with the share 
of the vote for the winning candidate (above or 
below 75%) determining whether a country scores 
6 or 7.
7   These four countries scored 6 or less in the Executive 
Index of Electoral Competitiveness in 2009, whereas 
the other four countries all scored the maximum 
7. (The results of the 2010 presidential election in 
Tanzania - which represented a wake-up call for the 
long-standing party of government, CCM -  mean 
that Tanzania also now scores 7 on the EIEC).
8   Khan 1995 argues that property rights tend to be 
fairly insecure in low income economies: as most 
asset values are low, this reduces the amount that 
it is worth investing to defend rights to them.
 9 In Tanzania President Nyerere did plenty of “ideology 
work” as part of establishing first TANU then CCM 
as an institutionalized, socialist-oriented party. 
Today the party remains more institutionalized than 
many African parties, with party organs claiming 
to determine key policies that individual ministers 
then implement. However, after several decades 
of uninterrupted power, during which time the 
country has transitioned towards a market-oriented 
economy, the ideology of the party has weakened. 
As already noted, it now encompasses factions of 
people who hold quite contrasting views on key 
issues of national development, but who all see 
CCM as the best route to obtaining political power.
10 The differing results may stem in part from the 
differences in the underlying databases. The 
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database used 
by Bates and Block 2009 is both more recent, 
thereby encompassing much more evidence from 
“democratic” systems, and includes more data 
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points. On the other hand, Bates and Block 2009 
rely on aggregate data for distortions for/against 
all cash crops in a country (when the President’s 
region is only likely to grow one or two of these), 
whereas Kasara 2007 looks at commodity-level 
effects.
11  Swing voting groups are not necessarily found in 
all countries, e.g. where one party consistently 
dominates power.
12     A noteworthy counter-example of public goods 
provision is the major investment in road and other 
infrastructure undertaken during the Kibaki 
presidency in Kenya, at a time when much 
government activity has been stalled by wrangling 
over the governing coalition. A plausible explanation 
for this is that senior politicians and (ex-) bureaucrats 
in Kenya have a long history of investment in 
domestic tourism, agribusiness and other 
enterprises, the competitiveness of which depends 
heavily on trunk infrastructure. In other words, this 
is apparently an example of a national elite pursuing 
its own interest, albeit one that happens to have 
wider spin-off benefits (North 1990).
13      Note, however, that the “competitive elections” 
variable is insignificant in Bates and Block 2009’s 
equations for cash crop taxation and presidential 
origin, so this remains a point of debate.
14      This conceptualization is analogous to that of an 
agricultural value chain and the competing efforts 
of the different players within the supply chain to 
capture the value created within the chain.
15    See also Collier 2007’s discussion of growth 
performance in natural-resource abundant 
economies under autocracy vs democracy with and 
without restraints.
16         Data are for responses to Q52: “Members of 
Parliament have different responsibilities. Which 
of the following do you think is the most important 
responsibility of your Member of Parliament?” 
Number of rural respondents to this question varied 
from 656 in Ghana to 1022 in Malawi. In figure 4, 
each category encompasses two responses as 
follows: “rural needs” = Listen to constituents and 
represent their needs + Deliver jobs or development; 
“national role” = Make laws for the good of the 
country + Monitor the president and his 
government; “don’t know” = don’t know + none of 
these (a very small number of responses in each 
case!).
17            Note that the link between government performance 
and voting for MPs may be strong in Ghana because 
of the dominance of two well-established parties 
in the country. One might also speculate regarding 
the incentives created by the “repeated play games” 
between these two parties and the electorate over 
five elections (soon to be six) since 1992. Lindberg 
2011 argues that Ghanaian voters have now begun 
to learn what it is important to vote for – and that 
politicians in turn are taking note of evolving voter 
behaviour.
18       Note that, where a country receives significant 
foreign exchange revenues from tourism (e.g. 
Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda), Figure 2 may 
overstate its relative dependence on agricultural 
exports, as tourism receipts are not fully captured 
in figures for merchandise exports.
19       Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007 further specify that 
external military threats should have “intermediate 
intensity and urgency” (p37) to produce this effect. 
In the case of “total war”, a regime’s time horizon 
will compress to focus only on immediate survival 
and, in pursuit of this objective, it may take decisions 
that are extremely damaging to the long-term 
interests of the wider population.
20          Current elections may be fair and indeed competitive, 
but with clear restrictions on the nature of 
competition (e.g. no ethnically-based appeals) and, 
therefore, on who can contest.
21       Another element of the government’s strategy is 
to discourage reference to ethnicity within the 
country, stressing instead the common heritage of 
all Rwandans. The implementation of land reform 
– presented as creating viable holding sizes essential 
for economic growth - is a key test of the sincerity 
of this (Pottier 2006).
22      Centralized control of rents and their deployment 
in support of long-term growth objectives is a 
common feature of both the early East Asian “tiger” 
economies (Khan 2000) and current Rwanda and 
Ethiopia (Kelsall 2011).
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Comparative Indicators 
Across PEAPA Countries
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